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The Bank War refers to the political struggle that developed over the issue of rechartering the Second Bank of the United States (BUS) during the Andrew Jackson administration (1829–1837).〔Remini, 1980, p. 323, p. 344〕 Anti-Bank Jacksonian Democrats were mobilized in opposition to the national bank’s re-authorization on the grounds that the institution conferred economic privileges on financial elites, violating U.S. constitutional principles of social equality.〔Hofstadter, 1948, p. 57: "One certain accomplishment of Jackson’s war on the Bank of the United States was to discharge the aggressions of citizens who felt injured by economic privilege" whether derived from banks or not.〕〔Wilentz, 2005, p.75: "Jackson raised principled and considered objections to the Bank as an unconstitutional aberration and an affront to popular sovereignty (that ) the Bank’s charter concentrated extraordinary power in the hands of a small coterie of unelected private bankers…"〕 The Jacksonians considered the Second Bank of the U.S. to be an illegitimate corporation whose charter violated state sovereignty and therefore it posed an implicit threat to the agriculture-based economy dependent upon the U.S. southern states' widely practiced institution of slavery.〔McPherson, 2007, p. 7: "In the antebellum (War ) South, the purpose of asserting state sovereignty was to protect slavery from the potential hostility of a national majority against Sothern interests – mainly slavery." McPherson quotes Old Republican Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina in the "1820s": ‘If Congress can make banks, they can free any slave in the United States."〕〔Dangerfield, 1966, p. 98: Senator John Taylor of Virginia (1820): "…if Congress can incorporate a bank, it might emancipate a slave."〕〔Schlesinger, 1945, p. 76: John Taylor "kept anti-bank feeling alive."〕 With the Bank charter due to expire in 1836, the President of the Bank of the United States, Nicholas Biddle, in alliance with the National Republicans under Senator Henry Clay (KY) and Senator Daniel Webster (MA), decided to make rechartering a referendum on the legitimacy of the institution in the general election of 1832.〔Hofstadter, 1948, p. 60: "…by the summer of 1832…Biddle, reluctantly, uncertainly, and under the prodding from Whig politicians…" decided to ask Congress for early recharter. Schlesinger, 1945, p. 85: "Biddle would have much preferred to keep the Bank out of politics altogether" Hammond, 1957, p. 385: "It was not Biddle's idea, but he did fall in with (recharter demands )...because he had found the () with Jackson would not ()" Remini, 1981, p. 343〕 When Congress voted to reauthorize the Bank, Jackson, as incumbent and candidate in the race, promptly vetoed the bill. His veto message justifying his action was a polemical declaration of the social philosophy of the Jacksonian movement〔Meyers, 1967, p.212: "As a national political phenomenon, Jacksonian Democracy drew heavily on the Bank War for its strength and its distinctive character." Wilentz, 2008, p. 369- 370: The veto message "a powerful elucidation of Jackson’s political and social philosophy…crafted for wide circulation to reach over the heads of Congress, build public support, and unite the disparate Jacksonian factions opposed to the BUS."〕 pitting "farmers, mechanics and laborers" against the "monied interest" and arguing against the Bank’s constitutionality.〔Hofstadter, 1948, p. 57: The Bank was viewed by Jacksonian Democrats as an assault upon "the planters, the farmers, the mechanic and the laborer" by the "monied interest" Wilentz, 2008, p. 370〕 Pro-Bank National Republicans warned the public that Jackson would abolish the Bank altogether if granted a second term.〔Wilentz, 2008, p. 368 Remini, 1981, p. 342〕 In the presidential campaigns of 1832, the BUS served as the central issue in mobilizing the opposing Jacksonian Democrats and National Republicans. Jackson and Biddle personified the positions on each side.〔Wilentz, 2005, p. 105: Whigs "were galvanized…by their views of one man, Andrew Jackson." Hammond, 1947, p. 160-161: "The hostility of Jackson to the () was in the first instance a matter of principle, the bank belonging to a monetary system and to a theory of federal powers which he disapproved; but later he and his followers could allege also that the Bank was rotten and Biddle dishonest. That allegation was, in fact, emphasized more than the original principle." Remini, 1981, p. 376-377〕 Jacksonians successfully concealed the incompatibility of their "hard money" and "paper money" factions in the anti-Bank campaign,〔Schlesinger, 1945, p. 79-80: "The essential incompatibility between cheap money () and hard money () could be somewhat concealed in the clamor of the () crusade" and Jackson would enlist the "Eastern (money )" and "Western (money )" wings of the Democrats, "two basically antagonistic groups" to launch the Bank War. And p. 80: "The () administration took care not to offend its cheap money adherents" by revealing their pro-hard ideology publicly. Hammond, 1947, p. 152: "Hard money was a cardinal tenet of the left () wing of the Democratic party…its aim was to clip the wings of the commerce and finance by restricting the credit that paper money enabled them to obtain…" and "There was also a pro-bank ‘paper-money wing’ which harbored the Democratic party’s…businessmen, promoters and speculators…(felt ) it had more to gain and less to lse from the states than from the federal government. This led it to take on the coloration and vocabulary of Jacksonian democracy and to exalt the rugged individualism of the entrepreneur and speculator along with that of the pioneer."〕 allowing Jackson to score an overwhelming victory against Henry Clay.〔Wilentz, 2008, p. 389: "Jackson won the presidency by an overwhelming popular and electoral count." Hammond, 1947, p. 155 Hofstadter, 1947, p. 61: Jackson was "reelected overwhelmingly on the bank issue…"〕 Fearing economic reprisals from Biddle and the Bank, Jackson moved swiftly to remove federal deposits from the institution. In 1833, he succeeded in distributing the funds to several dozen private banks throughout the country.〔Hofstadter, 1948, p. 62〕 The new Whig Party emerged in opposition to his perceived abuse of executive power, officially censuring Jackson in the Senate.〔Wilentz, 2008, p. 402〕 In an effort to promote sympathy for the institution’s survival, Biddle retaliated by contracting Bank credit, inducing a serious and protracted financial downturn.〔Wilentz, 2008, p. 396-397〕 A reaction set in throughout America’s financial and business centers against Biddle’s economic warfare,〔Wilentz, 2005, p,399-400: "The censure was the last hurrah of the Pro-Bank defenders in the Bank War – soon thereafter a reaction set in. business leaders in the American financial centers were convinced that Biddle’s war on Jackson was more destructive than Jackson’s war on the Bank."〕 compelling the Bank to reverse its tight money policies.〔Hofstadter, 1947, p. 61-62: In retaliation to get the deposits returned, Biddle "brought about a short-lived but severe depression through restriction of credit, which only ended when the business community itself rebelled." Schlesinger, 1945, p. 111: Former Biddle supporters discerned that the "() contraction was not necessary to the safety of the Bank and that () whole object was to extort a charter from the government."〕 By the close of 1834, recharter was a "lost cause."〔Wilentz, 2008, p. 401〕 Rather than permitting the Bank to go out of existence, Biddle arranged its conversion to a state chartered corporation in Pennsylvania just weeks before its federal charter expired in March 1836. This episode in the Bank’s decline and fall ended in 1841 with liquidation of the institution. Jackson’s campaign against the Bank had triumphed.〔Hammond, 1947, p. 157: "…in fall 1839, the bank suspended payment of its obligations" () "In 1841…its was assigned to trustees for liquidation.〕 ==The Resurrection of a National Banking System== Though supported by President James Madison and his Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin〔Wilentz, 2008, p. 203: Madison and Gallatin supported the BUS revival citing "expediency" and "necessity", not principle.〕 opponents of the First Bank of the United States defeated recharter by a single vote in both the House and Senate in 1811.〔Wilentz, 2008, p. 203: Failed by exactly "one vote" in both House and Senate.〕 Opposition came from several fronts, including states’ rights advocates opposed to the doctrine of implied powers, private banking interests who objected to the regulatory effects of the BUS, and big mercantilists, including John Jacob Astor, who had disputes with the Bank’s directors.〔Wilentz, 2008, p. 203-204: Wilentz lists three opposition forces: Old Republicans, state (private) banks and big merchants. Van Deusen, 1959, p. 64: Van Deusen lists enemies of the BUS as "state banks…hard-money men…workingmen, because they were frequently paid in state () banknotes of fluctuating value…(the ) President of the United States."〕〔Remini, 1981, p. 27: The First BUS "was allowed to expire in 1811 as a result of the concerted action of the state banks..."〕 The practical arguments in favor of reviving a national system of finance, as well as internal improvements and protective tariffs, were prompted by national security concerns during the War of 1812 and its aftermath〔Wilentz, 2008, p. 181: "The war’s immense strain…" had promoted this economic nationalism, though most "enterprises" in industry was "tied politically to () Republicans."〕 which had "demonstrated the absolute necessity of a national banking system"〔Remini, 1981, p. 27〕 The roots for the resurrection of the Bank of the United States lay fundamentally in the transformation of America from a simple agrarian economy to one that was becoming interdependent with finance and industry.〔Meacham, 2008, p. 46: "In Jackson’s era America was moving from a way of life based on farms to one fundamentally linked to a larger industrialized economy." Schlesinger, 1945, p. 18: The revival of the Bank of the United States indicated a "breakdown" of the Jeffersonian "idyl". Hammond, 1956, p. 10: "During Andrew Jackson’s lifetime three things had begun to alter prodigiously the economic life of America. These were steam (), () credit, and natural resources."〕 Vast western lands were opening for white settlement,〔Wilentz, 2005, p. 35: Jackson’s "defeat of the Creeks opened up millions of acres of land for white settlement…"〕 accompanied by rapid development, enhanced by steam power and financial credit.〔Hammond, 1956, p. 10: The industrial revolution "was now turning Anglo-Saxon America from modest agrarian interests…to the dazzling possibilities of industrial exploitation…transform() from one that was Jeffersonian and agrarian to one that was financial and industrial."〕 Economic planning at the federal level was deemed necessary by Republican nationalists to promote expansion and encourage private enterprise.〔Goodrich, 1948, p. 61: Jefferson’s Secretary of State Gallatin called for a national "system of () improvement" and Representative Calhoun promoted a national bank, "chartering of the Second Bank of the United States seemed to provide a special opportunity for action."〕〔Wilentz, 2008, p. 205: "()oung national Republicans of the South and West (joined by ) an eastern monied group that strongly advocated the creation of a stable ad efficient national system of money and credit. Their idea was to Republicanize Hamiltonian bank policy…"〕 In 1815, Secretary of State James Monroe informed President James Madison that a national bank "would attach the commercial part of the community in a much greater degree to the Government () interest them in its operations…This is the great desideratum (objective ) of our system."〔Wilentz, 2008, p. 204〕 Support for this "national system of money and finance" grew with the post-war economy and land boom, uniting the interests of eastern financiers with southern and western Republican nationalists who sought to "Republicanize Hamiltonian bank policy."〔Wilentz, 2008, p. 205〕 and "employ Hamiltonian means to Jeffersonian ends."〔Dangerfield, 1965 p. 7〕 The era of laissez faire was underway.〔Hammond, 1956, p. 10: "Jeffersonian…basic conceptions changed insensibly from the libertarianism of ararians to that of laissez faire…" and p. 102: "The Jacksonians, as distinct from Jackson himself, wanted a world where laissez faire prevailed…where everyone would be free to get rich…" Goodrich, 1948, p. 66: "The conventional plea for internal improvements…began with a recognition of the validity of laissez faire as a fundamental principle…" Hofstadter, 1948, p. 55-56: "…()n the Jacksonian period the democratic upsurge was closely linked to the ambition of the small capitalist…(a ) spirit of enterprise" typical of rural and urban Americans.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Bank War」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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